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Introduction
The process of globalisation affecting goods and financial markets together with the increase in
capital mobility have led economists to reconsider the problem of exchange rates. The parallel
increase in the number of countries opting for an extreme solution (currency boards, dollarisation
and monetary unification on the one hand and free floating on the other) seems to suggest that
both markets globalisation and capital mobility are better dealt with by exchange rate regimes
allowing substantial exchange rate flexibility or adopting hard currency pegs. Recent analyses
show, on the contrary, that ‘for many developing countries with less linkage to global capital
markets, the viability and suitability of exchange rate pegs is greater’ (Mussa et al 2000: 2).
Although economists continue to disagree about the reasons for exchange rate variations, there
seems to be an even wider disagreement as to the need to consider a whole series of possible
regimes each single country will have to opt for according to its peculiar situation.
At a recent meeting of the American Economic Association, Fischer delivered a lecture in
which he presented the various options open to countries, the evolution in their choices during
the past decade, and the tendency towards bi-polar or two-corner solutions. In particular, he
maintains that ‘[i]t is reasonable to believe, as EMU expands, and as other economies reconsider
the costs and benefits of maintaining a national currency [...] that more countries will adopt very
hard pegs, and that there will in the future be fewer national currencies’ (Fischer 2001: 17). Our
purpose here is to consider the ‘soft’ peg and the ‘hard’ peg solutions in order to show:
1. that each of them entails serious drawbacks for the countries implementing it; and
2. that the same desired result – exchange rate stability – may be reached by means of an
alternative solution that preserves monetary sovereignty and does not require any
intervention on the foreign exchange market.
Throughout the paper we take it for granted that exchange rate stability is to be preferred to
free floating for the twofold reason that stability stimulates investment as well as trade and that
exchange rate fluctuations are essentially erratic and of a speculative kind1. What we are claiming
is therefore that countries should not be forced to choose between fixed or flexible
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4exchange rates, but between the present structure of international payments and a reformed
system ensuring exchange rate stability. In the present system, fixed exchange rates have a cost
that exceeds their advantages and makes them not viable in the long term. What is needed at the
international level is a system in which exchange rate stability becomes an automatic result of its
current mechanism, without any need for countries to intervene on the foreign exchange market
or to limit their monetary sovereignty. This may be achieved through a reform allowing for the
vehicular use of the unit chosen as the international currency, and based on the principles of
bank money and multilateral clearing. In the last part of the paper we give a brief numerical
example of the way the new system may work. Very simple in its application, the reform may be
implemented in steps, first by a group of countries of the same monetary area, for example, and
then by the IMF world-wide.
As the euro is about to be adopted by the EU member countries2 as their unique currency,
let us pay particular attention to the pros and cons of European monetary unification. Capital
accumulation and capital movements are phenomena that seem to have been underestimated by
supporters of a single currency area. The loss of monetary sovereignty will have important effects
on these phenomena, which will put the project of European unification under serious threat. It
is therefore essential to investigate them and to tackle the question of whether or not it is necessary
to give up monetary sovereignty in order to give Europe its own currency and a stable monetary
system.
Soft pegged exchange rates
Countries choosing to peg their currency to a ‘strong’ foreign currency or to a basket of currencies
commit themselves to limit (or even reduce to zero as in the case of currency boards) the extent
of fluctuation of exchange rates. Several possibilities are open to them, from managed floats to
currency boards, passing through adjustable and crawling pegs, adjustable and crawling bands,
and fixed pegs. In the case of soft pegged exchange rates, it has been claimed that they are not
particularly well equipped to suit those countries highly involved with international capital
markets. ‘[S]oft peg systems have not proved viable over any lengthy period, especially for
countries integrated or integrating into the international capital markets’ (Fischer 2001: 7). It is
not difficult to understand, in fact, that pegged exchange rates of countries involved in capital
markets are easily subjected to speculative pressures, which may be contrasted only through
monetary policies that put a strain on their domestic economy as well as on their financial system.
‘Countries that are not adequately prepared to withstand the potential strains of exchange rate
defense should beware of slipping into exchange rate pegs that may later foster serious economic
and financial crises’ (Mussa et al 2000: 34).
In a regime of pegged exchange rates, monetary authorities must be prepared to intervene
both on the foreign exchange market and on the financial market to defend the external stability
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international capital market of the country implementing it, a flexibility of its fiscal policy and of
its labour market, a close connection of its economy and of its financial system with those of the
country with which it is pegged, and a high level of international reserves. IMF experts and
economists are certainly right in observing that pegged exchange rates are not suited to emerging
economies with strong links to global financial markets. Recent crises – the tequila, Asian,
Russian and Brasilian crises – have shown that these economies are more subject than others to
speculative pressures on their exchange rates, and that those which had pegged their currency
suffered the most from the fluctuations on the capital markets. As noted by Fischer, ‘[i]n several
countries, extensive damage has been caused by the collapses of pegged rate regimes that lasted
for some time, and enjoyed some credibility. The belief that the exchange rate will not change
removes the need to hedge, and reduces perceptions of the risk of borrowing in foreign currencies.
This makes any crisis that does strike exceptionally damaging in its effects on banking systems,
corporations, and government finances’ (Fischer 2001: 7).
At this point a critical reader might ask whether there is any good reason to keep considering
a system of soft-peg exchange rates as a viable regime at all. Most experts would answer that
countries respecting the conditions listed above are likely to benefit from such a regime insofar
as it would grant their currencies greater stability on the foreign exchange market. Others would
plump for a free floating system, arguing that in the present system of international payments
free exchange rate fluctuations are the best balancing mechanism available to countries. All
would probably agree that solutions vary according to the country and the period of time
considered. Now, while most of these observations are a matter of common sense, some of them
rest on the assumption that exchange rates are bound to fluctuate more or less erratically unless
a country commits itself to supporting the costs of a monetary policy capable of reducing the
destabilising pressures on the foreign exchange market.
A rigorous analysis of the way the present system of international payments works shows
that this is indeed the case today. In this respect, it is worth noting that experts such as Fischer,
Mussa, Masson, Swoboda, Obstfeld, Eichengreen, Isard and many others tend to recognise that
exchange rate fluctuations are mostly erratic and due to speculative capital movements more
than to fundamentals. In a system where currencies are considered as if they were real goods,
exchange rates are defined as their relative prices and their variation is directly influenced by
supply and demand on the foreign exchange market. Attempts to reduce or control exchange rate
fluctuations through a soft peg are therefore bound to failure in the medium or long term, since
their cost can hardly be supported for long by any country, let alone by a developing country.
While it is indisputable that exchange rate stability is to be preferred to erratic fluctuations, it
seems hopeless to pursue this aim through a regime requiring national monetary authorities to
contrast erratic fluctuations provoked by international speculative capital movements.
Even more so when referred to countries open to global financial markets, does this
conclusion apply also when pegged exchange rates are replaced by currency boards or by
dollarisation? Let us briefly analyse these two cases in succession.
6Currency boards
As shown by Fischer (2001), in the last ten years an increasing number of countries has opted for
a system of hard peg known as ‘currency board’, in which the government is institutionally
committed to converting its national money into a foreign currency (usually the US dollar) at a
fixed exchange rate. Argentina is the emblematic example of this kind of exchange rate regime.
The high level of inflation suffered by the peso led Argentina’s monetary authorities to enter a
currency board in 1991.
The risks of using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor are usually identified with the
fact that ‘interest rates become completely independent of the will of the domestic monetary
authorities [because they] are closely linked to those of the anchor currency’ (Mussa et al 2000:
26). In a currency board regime, in fact, monetary policy is subordinated to the maintaining of
fixed exchange rates and convertibility so that fluctuations in domestic interest rates ‘are
determined by foreign exchange inflows and outflows’ (p. 25). On the other hand, benefits would
derive from the exchange rate stability, an increased control over fiscal policy and the credibility
of the economic policy regime.
While entering a currency board a country does not give up its monetary sovereignty, it is
clear that its commitment to guarantee convertibility seriously reduces its autonomy. This may
prove useful insofar as it forces the country’s monetary authorities to avoid inflationary over-
emissions, but it might dangerously limit the process of capital accumulation within the country.
The rigidity of the system is due to the fact that a currency board ‘must hold foreign reserves at
least equal to its total monetary liabilities’ (p. 26), and that, in its pure form, it ‘cannot extend
credit’ (p. 26). Hence, if it seems indisputable that modern currency boards have been successful
in enhancing credibility of countries coming out of a period of high- or hyper-inflation, there is
also evidence that ‘[e]ach of the major international capital market-related crises since 1994 [...]
has in some way involved a fixed or pegged exchange rate regime’ (Fischer 2001: 1).
The arguments against currency board arrangements range from the claim that nominal
exchange rate invariability slows down adjustment to external or internal shocks, to the claim
that countries entering a currency board must give up their seigniorage as well as the lender of
last resort function of their central banks. Let us consider, for example, the case in which Argentina
has to face a substantial increase in the exchange rate of the US dollar as against most of the rest
of the world’s currencies. As a consequence of this external shock, Argentina’s exports will
decrease and its current account deficit increase. Fischer observes that an adjustment will have
to take place through wage and price flexibility. But, while a decrease in wages is supposed to
entail a decrease in prices capable to stimulate exports, Argentina’s population is likely to suffer
from a substantial worsening of its standard of living. Paid for in US dollars, imported goods and
services will in fact become the more expensive the greater the fall in wages entailed by the
adjustment process. Of course, this negative effect would occur also if Argentina opted for a
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but its imports would be more costly in terms of pesos. Yet, this simply shows that neither a
currency board nor a flexible exchange rate system is a good solution. While the loss of seigniorage
is a fallacy deriving from a poor understanding of modern banking3 and the lender of last resort
function of central banks can be ‘compensated for by the creation [...] of a banking sector
stabilization fund’ (p. 16) and by other measures of supervision, control and collaboration, the
strain put on the domestic economy of a country entering a currency board is a serious shortcoming
calling for renewed efforts to find a viable solution to both currency boards and floating exchange
rate regimes.
Even though currency board and flexible exchange rate regimes are likely to suffer from
the same disadvantages due to a substantial increase in the US dollar exchange rate, the case
against the hard-peg system is strengthened by the fact that a country implementing a currency
board has no degree of freedom as to its monetary emission. The commitment to redeeming
its monetary liabilities at a fixed exchange rate forces a currency board country to hold foreign
reserves at least equal to its total domestic currency. In the case of Argentina, this implies that
banks’ monetary emission of pesos is limited by the amount of US dollar stocked within the
Argentinean banking system. Needless to say, this dangerously limits the capacity of the
banking system to respond to the demand for monetary intermediation coming from
Argentina’s productive sector. In other words, Argentina’s productive capacity cannot expand
beyond the limits posed by the availability of US dollars. Hence, if Argentina wants to
increase its domestic output, it has to increase its reserves of US dollars, which it may do
either by exporting more or by contracting a new external debt. In both cases, the growth in
domestic production will cost Argentina twice its price. To the cost of production proper,
Argentina will in fact have to add the cost of the goods, services and financial claims it sells in
exchange for the US dollars required as guarantee to the monetary emission of its banks.
In order to gain credibility for its monetary policy, Argentina has chosen to peg its currency
so hard as to lose, de facto, a great part of its monetary sovereignty. The price it has to pay does
not seem to be balanced by the advantages it derives from exchange rate stability, so much so
that the advantages could be obtained without being forced to transform its currency into a
surrogate of the US dollar. Argentina’s economic system needs to be backed by an autonomous
banking system capable to monetise, without any arbitrary restriction, the whole of its productive
activity. This cannot be the case under a currency board regime, whose advantages are therefore
overwhelmingly overtaken by the restraints imposed to the economic activity of the countries
that choose it.
Before moving on to consider the hardest variety of pegged exchange rates – i.e. dollarisation
– let us observe that at a meeting held at the IMF, November 2000, Mundell openly declared to
be in favour of currency board arrangements. According to the Nobel laureate, it might even be
conceivable to introduce a currency board system at the world level, for ‘[a]fter all, that’s what
the gold standard was – it was what people nowadays call a currency board system’ (Mundell et
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country fixed the convertibility rate of its domestic currency with gold. Thus, gold was the
common denominator that allowed national currencies to be made homogeneous before being
exchanged one against the other. Expressed in terms of gold, exchange rates were determined on
an absolute basis that gave them its own stability. In a currency board system, where currencies
are convertible into the dollar, what would be the common denominator between them and the
American currency? Gold is a real good, whereas the dollar is the US domestic currency, and it
is an entirely different thing to anchor a currency to a real good or to another currency. Under the
gold standard each currency had an absolute value and could be considered equivalent to any
other of the same tenor. In a currency board system, national currencies would derive their value
from the American IOU, since, outside the US, that is what the dollar actually is: a mere
acknowledgement of debt issued by the US banking system. Hence, convertibility, which in the
gold standard was a principle guaranteeing monetary homogeneity, would become, in a currency
board system, an absurd obstacle to monetary sovereignty.
Dollarisation
Some authors4 have recently argued in favour of dollarisation, a process that has spread mainly
in Central America, where Ecuador and El Salvador have just joined Panama in the group of
countries that have replaced their domestic currency with the US dollar. The advantages of
dollarisation as compared to currency board regimes are said to lie ‘in the reduction in spreads
and the strengthening of the financial system’ (Fischer 2001: 16). The obvious difference between
the two systems is that through dollarisation a country does away with its national currency.
Exchange rate problems with the US currency are also definitively dealt with, of course. In fact,
they are literally suppressed together with the suppression of domestic money. Identified with
the US dollar, the currency of these countries floats jointly with the floating of the US currency.
Now, the shortcomings related to currency board regimes become evident in the case of
dollarisation. In particular, countries that choose this radical solution against their monetary
instability must confine the credit activity of their banking systems to the amount of US dollar
deposited with them. In contrast with what happens in the United States, these countries’ banks
are not allowed to issue new dollars, either to monetise their domestic production or to pay for
their country’s net commercial imports. What they can do is merely to lend the dollars they own
as deposits. Of course, a central bank may increase its reserve of US dollars by incurring a new
foreign debt. But this means that the countries that have dollarised their monetary systems must
run into debt in order to be able to monetise their own production. Hence, either they cut production
or they pay twice its new costs. In both cases the price of dollarisation is so high that it is hard to
understand how it can be imposed on the population.
Things would be different if banks of ‘dollarised’ countries were allowed to issue their
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could agree to accept these countries as new States of the Union, or it would force their banks to
change the denomination of their currencies. The first scenario is not likely to draw much favour,
and would have drastic consequences from the political and cultural points of view. The second
solution would restore the situation existing before dollarisation, since it would bring out the
substantial difference existing between the US dollar and the dollar used within other countries.
Economists seem to be aware of the consequences of dollarisation, even though they do
not always have a clear perception of all of them. For example, Fischer claims that ‘[f]or a small
economy, heavily dependent in its trade and capital account transactions on a particular large
economy, it may well make sense to adopt the currency of that country, particularly if provision
can be made for the transfer of seigniorage’ (Fischer 2001: 17). Now, if it is true that such an
economy should be allowed to issue the currency it needs in order to monetise its production
(and it is in this sense that Fischer’s use of the concept of seigniorage is interpreted), we should
not forget to analyse the implications for the US monetary system. If the FED were not prepared
to control the banking system of the ‘dollarised’ country and to include it in its clearing system,
the dollars issued in that country would become a source of instability. In particular, if the central
bank were to abuse its lender of last resort function (which still happens to a worrying extent in
numerous LDCs), the inflationary increase of dollars would have negative consequences in all
the dollar areas. Besides, the ‘dollarised’ country would be able to pay in newly issued dollars
for its net purchases of goods and services. Thus, the amount of dollars held abroad would
increase and define the net debt of the dollar area as a whole, independently of the geographical
location of the banks carrying out the payments.
In conclusion, this extreme solution does not seem to be appropriate, either for the LDCs
likely to adopt it, or for the United States. The loss of monetary sovereignty has a host of negative
side-effects when it is unilateral. What happens instead when monetary sovereignty is given up
simultaneously by a group of countries deciding to create a monetary union? The case of European
monetary unification is by far the most important of all, and it is to its analysis that we are
devoting the greater part of our study.
Currency unions
Another solution to exchange rate instability implying the loss of monetary sovereignty is the
creation of a currency union among independent countries. Although it is not the first case of
monetary unification, the creation of a European monetary area is the most significant example
of such a solution. Unlike what happens for the CFA zone, the European project will soon lead
to the actual replacement of national currencies with an entirely new currency – the euro – and to
the monetary birth of a new country – the United States of Europe. Of course, the introduction of
the euro will remove any risk of exchange rate fluctuations among the twelve European currencies
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replaced by the European currency. Abandoning monetary sovereignty, on the other hand, will
require an increased macroeconomic co-ordination ranging from common monetary and fiscal
policies to a greater integration of labour and commodity markets. Co-operation and regional
solidarity will also prove essential in the process, and it is to be feared that this might prove to be
more difficult to obtain than generally recognised. Worries come from the observation that the
criteria for the successful implementation of a single currency area are not entirely satisfied by
EU countries. It is no mystery that a whole variety of ‘public accounting fiddles’ (Dafflon and
Rossi 1999: 63) have occurred during 1997, the year chosen to verify if countries complied with
the convergence criteria imposed by the Maastricht Treaty. Things have not drastically improved
since, and there are signs that disparities are far from heading towards reduction. In this context,
one feels entitled to ask whether monetary unification is indeed going to benefit EU countries, in
other words whether it is actually true that advantages far outweigh disadvantages.
In order to answer this question we have to consider the full implications of free capital
mobility that the euro will make possible within the new European monetary area. As noted by
Obstfeld ‘this [capital mobility] is a very relevant issue. Here, I think the question of whether
capital mobility enhances the gains from a single currency or not depends very much on the type
of capital flow that is being considered’ (Mundell et al 2000: 4). Let us dwell briefly on this
matter.
The concept of capital flight has often been taken to mean – literally – that capitals may
leave the country in which they originate to be ‘hidden’ or invested abroad. Now, while it is true
that capitals may be illegally concealed from fiscal authorities by being transferred to a foreign
banking system, it is mistaken to believe that by doing so they also escape their original banking
system. If a resident of country A manages to hide his capital by transferring it to a foreign bank
(of country B), he causes his national fiscal authorities a net loss; it is a fact. However, this does
not entail an equivalent loss for his domestic banking system. Double-entry book-keeping prevents
such loss. In reality, the entire amount ‘transferred’ abroad remains deposited with A’s banking
system, the fraudulent resident exchanging it for an equivalent deposit with B’s banking system.
This means that national monetary boundaries are a natural barrier against capital movements,
which become entirely free only within a single monetary area.
Logically, even investment between countries does not modify the amount of capital initially
available in each of them. Of course, the logical impossibility for capital to leave a country’s
banking system does not mean that capitals cannot be invested from a country to another; in this
sense, capital mobility would not be hampered. Let us suppose, for example, that residents of
country A are willing to invest part of their capital in country B. If they do so, this does not mean
that the amount of capital available in A is decreased by the amount invested in B, but only that
country B is now the owner of a sum of bank deposits formed in A’s banking system. In the event
that A’s residents invest by purchasing financial assets issued by B’s residents, country A’s
investment amounts to its lending to B a capital in money A that B can spend to finance its
imports from country A. Things are not radically different if A’s residents invest their capitals
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simply by acquiring a deposit with B’s banking system, that is, by purchasing claims of various
liquidity from the banks of country B. The capitals thus invested by A’s residents remain deposited
in A’s banking system but they are now owned by B’s residents (while A’s residents become the
owners of an equivalent sum of B’s bank deposits). Hence, by transferring their capitals to country
B, A’s residents actually convert them into an equivalent capital formed in B. Their investment
does not reduce the amount of capital available in A, the whole amount of which is thus liable to
be invested – either directly or indirectly – in this same country. If it is lent to firms in A, the
investment is direct; if it is lent to country B it becomes part of B’s foreign transactions and
finances its imports from country A, thus defining an indirect investment in A. In both cases, it is
correct to claim that whatever the decision taken by A’s residents their financial transactions do
not decrease the amount of capital that may be invested in A.
The same result applies also when a sum of domestic currency is entered as an asset into a
foreign banking system. This happens, for example, when a key-currency country pays for its net
commercial imports. The banking system of the creditor country is credited with a positive
amount of key-currency that remains deposited within the debtor country. Already explained by
Rueff in the 1960s, this phenomenon entails a duplication of the key currency, which does not
alter in the least the amount deposited in its banking system. It is double-entry book-keeping that
brings about this result, which will hold good as long as countries do not give up their monetary
sovereignty.
By adhering to monetary unification, EU countries will de facto create a single area within
which capitals will move as freely as they do within each national monetary system. It is precisely
this free capital movement in the euro area that is likely to bring about the most serious troubles
for the EU. It is a well-known fact that capitals move from the regions of lesser to those of higher
productivity, which, in the last decades, means from South to North. This would mean that, in
the euro area, capital will ‘flee’ from the southern to the northern part of Europe, thus increasing
disparities among countries of the two ‘regions’. In particular, it is not exaggerated to forecast
that unemployment will grow dramatically in the region suffering from capital flight and that
public transfers will prove insufficient to match its negative effects.
It is true, of course, that the financial structure of the capital accumulated so far by each
country will play an important role in determining the way capital will move within the EU. For
example, if the capital accumulated by firms of a given southern country in, say, the last ten
years has been obtained by selling medium- to long-term bonds, monetary unification will put
them at a disadvantage with respect to their northern competitors. The cost of capital accumulated
in the southern countries is in fact higher than that accumulated in the northern countries.
Disparities in the gross rate of profit and reduced costs of production have allowed southern
firms to remain competitive so far. Monetary unification, however, will increase their current
costs without reducing the cost of the capital accumulated prior to the introduction of the euro.
In these conditions it is very likely that even firms of the most productive regions of the South
will be forced to accelerate their restructuring process drastically. Mergers with northern firms
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will probably increase and employment will be the first to suffer from the measures adopted in
order to avoid closure.
This might be thought to be the very pessimistic scenario of a euro-sceptic. It is not. If the
European unification project is to have a real chance of success, difficulties must be faced and
discussed openly and not kept hidden from the public. If this is not done, Europeans could well
refuse to pay the price of unification and force their countries to move back to monetary and
political sovereignty. The question has to be tackled whether European countries can afford a
drastic increase in capital movements. In other words, will there be an efficient network of
adjustments capable to contrast its negative effects? The limited mobility of workers, the lack of
fiscal redistribution mechanisms of some importance, and the structural rigidity of numerous
economies would seem to deny it. If this is indeed the case, would it not be better to think again
about giving up monetary sovereignty? The answer is closely related to the possibility to achieve
monetary stability without adopting a common and unique currency. Is exchange rate stability a
result that necessarily implies monetary unification? Apparently, yes. As we have seen, neither
‘soft’ nor ‘hard’ pegs are viable solutions, and free floating is, by definition, a system where
exchange rates are essentially unstable. Yet, despite appearances to the contrary, a new structure
of payments can be devised, which ensures the automatic stability of exchange rates between the
countries adopting it, and which is perfectly euro-compatible. Let us expound the main principles
on which it rests.
Towards a new regime of stable exchange rates compatible with the safeguard of monetary
sovereignty
Today’s exchange rate regimes belong to the category of relative exchanges, for currencies are
considered as if they were real goods and exchange rates are defined as their relative prices, i.e.
as the price of each of them expressed in terms of one or the other with which it is exchanged on
the foreign exchange market. By close analogy with what is supposed to happen on the commodity
market – at least according to the neoclassical point of view –, exchange rates are thus made to
depend on supply and demand, and their determination becomes a matter of equilibrium. To
avoid the instability inherent in every concept of equilibrium it is necessary to move from a
regime in which exchange rates are identified with relative prices to a new regime in which
currencies are no longer objects of trade per se, and exchange rate does not define the price of
one currency in terms of another. Does such a claim sound strange to the modern reader? We
think not. The oddity is rather that in the year 2001 there are still economists believing in the
physical nature of money. Modern banking, e-money and speculative financial transactions are a
clear proof of the substantial dematerialisation of money. How is it possible to claim that a
simple, numerical means of exchange can be transformed into an object of exchange? If it is
true, as shown by Rueff and definitively confirmed by double-entry book-keeping, that national
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currencies may enter a foreign banking system only as mere duplicates, how can it be maintained
that, once abroad, national currencies are transformed into a stock of autonomous monetary
assets? But, if it is agreed that money is a non-dimensional means and not an object of exchange,
it should be clear that our payment systems must be structured in such a way as to comply with
the vehicular nature of money. This can be done if today’s regime of relative exchange rates is
replaced by a system of absolute exchange rates in which each currency is exchanged against
itself (albeit through another one or through a common standard such as the euro).
Let us take the European example. The idea is that exchange rate stability can be achieved
without replacing the national currencies of EU member countries with the euro. Yet, the euro
will play an essential role in the new system, as will the European central bank (ECB). In order
to avoid duplication as well as exchange rate fluctuations, transactions among EU countries and
between them and the Rest of the World will have to be carried out in euros. It is the ECB that
will be called upon to issue the euro according to the same principles of double-entry book-
keeping adopted at the national level. As already observed by Keynes in his plan of reform
presented at Bretton Woods in 1944, the necessary balance between liabilities and assets will be
enough to prevent any problem of monetary liquidity. This means that double-entry book-keeping
is all the ECB needs in order to provide the EU countries with the amount of vehicular euros
required to monetise their external transactions. However, if we were to stop here, the system
would not be viable, for it would leave us with the problem of how countries are to finance their
unsettled transactions. It is again the ECB that must intervene by acting as a financial intermediary.
What is required in order to give a real content to the payments in euro is a system of inter-
European clearing. The principle is well known. Adopting a real-time gross settlement system,
the ECB will carry out payments between member countries only if each of them provides for its
financial backing. In simple terms, this means that a country must finance its net commercial
imports by an equivalent amount of exports of goods, services or securities.
It is not difficult to show5 that if external payments are carried out through the monetary
and financial intermediation of the ECB, each national currency is instantaneously exchanged
against itself through the euro. In other, more traditional words, each currency is simultaneously
offered against and demanded by the euro, which obviously leaves its exchange rate unaltered.
Together with the central banks of the member countries, the ECB is thus the key element of the
new system. Thanks to them, European countries will be allowed to benefit from their monetary
sovereignty until it proves necessary. In the meantime, they will create a common monetary area
that, besides guaranteeing exchange rate stability, will provide a strong link among member
countries, and make of the euro the European currency vis-à-vis the Rest of the World. Far from
being a ‘second best’ solution, the new system will allow a better start to the process of European
unification without hampering it with the negative consequences of the sudden loss of monetary
sovereignty.
As already noted, the reform is based both on the vehicular use of the euro and on a system
of inter-European clearing managed by the ECB. As such, it will allow co-operation among
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member countries to be strengthened, particularly at the level of monetary and economic policies,
yet at the pace and to the extent better suited to an harmonious process of economic and political
convergence. Although the main purpose of the ECB will be that of providing EU member
countries with an orderly payments system, nothing will prevent it from playing a more active
role, both in order to promote new forms of co-operation among national central banks and to
widen its field of intervention. For example, we may well imagine a scenario in which the ECB
could intervene on the European financial markets to place its own securities. Through its active
financial intermediation, less developed countries of the euro area – which could easily be extended
to incorporate other European countries now on the EU waiting list – could thus find new resources,
besides those invested directly by their fellow countries, to accelerate their economic recovery.
Well managed, this  instrument could prove extremely helpful in reducing today’s discrepancies
between rich and poor countries, thus reinforcing solidarity among EU countries.
Everybody knows how difficult it is to implement a mechanism of income redistribution
through fiscal policy. Likewise, it is no mystery that public efforts to compensate for the lack of
private investment have very rarely been successful. If EU countries were to lose their monetary
sovereignty as planned, it is easy to imagine how difficult it would be to force a mechanism of
fiscal redistribution upon residents of the northern regions, or to transfer public funds to the
southern regions. If, instead, EU countries were to maintain their national currencies and adopt
the new payments system proposed here, transfers would take place through the financial
intermediation of the ECB. This means that, by selling its securities on the European financial
markets, the ECB will collect private capitals and invest them in the countries most in need of
them. Fiscal redistribution and public transfers would then be replaced by an investment of
private capitals carried out by the ECB. Of course, the ECB financial activity would have to be
rigorously supervised and would have to respect the principles of sound banking. If these obvious
requirements are fulfilled, there are no reasons to believe that the ECB intermediation will not
prove to be a much more efficient means of redistribution than any public mechanism (which
would retain its importance only for social purposes and be autonomously implemented by each
country).
As already mentioned, another advantage of the new regime of absolute exchange rates
would be to greatly facilitate the extension of the euro area to other European countries. Since
countries will no longer be asked to replace their national currencies with the euro and thus be
transformed into regions of one sole new country, requirements for adhering to the new European
system of payments will be easily met by would-be member countries. In fact, conditions for
membership would be limited to one’s commitment to comply with the rules of the system. Each
new country applying for membership should simply be prepared to have its central bank
collaborate with the ECB and adopt the euro and the European clearing system for the settlement
of its external transactions. Hence, while the new system of external payments will allow each
new member country to benefit from a regime of exchange rate stability, the collaboration with
the ECB will favour the implementation of all the reforms needed to guarantee the orderly working
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of their domestic monetary system. This is not to say that the ECB will exert any direct control
whatsoever over any member country’s monetary system. Let us repeat it with no room for
ambiguity: each member country will retain its monetary sovereignty and will be free to choose
the fiscal and monetary policies best suited to its needs. Yet, monetary sovereignty is not enough
to guarantee monetary order. Collaboration with the ECB should precisely help less advanced
countries to organise their banking system in such a way as to avoid any anomaly.
Let us also observe that the use of the euro as a means of international payment (both
among European countries and between them and the Rest of the World) does not prevent
European residents from using euro-banknotes for their payments. Domestic transactions would
be settled in domestic currencies, but it would be neither unreal nor wrong to imagine that some
of them may be settled by using euro-banknotes. Tourism is the most obvious example. German
residents might well spend their holidays in Italy and pay for them in euro-banknotes obtained in
exchange for marks. The ECB would still be involved in the operation, for it is through its
intermediation that German banks can provide their clients with euro-banknotes, and that these
same banknotes give Italy a credit in its clearing account. The euro-banknotes earned by Italian
residents, in fact, are transferred to the ECB (through the intermediary of the Bank of Italy),
where they are credited on the Italian clearing deposit. Not surprisingly, services sold to German
tourists are part of Italy’s exports and increase its capacity to import goods, services and securities
from Germany (or from another EU country). If, for political reasons deriving from the symbolism
conveyed by euro-banknotes, the use of European notes were encouraged, the new system would
easily adjust to it, to everybody’s satisfaction.
In conclusion, the passage from a regime of relative to one of absolute exchange rates
would mark a radical change for the European monetary system. Without depriving EU countries
of their national currencies, the new structure of payments will gather the different countries
together in a common area where transactions among them will all be settled by the use of a
common money: the euro. While protecting themselves from capital flight, EU countries will
benefit from a mechanism guaranteeing exchange rate stability and will, in the meantime, create
the sound premises for an increasing economic integration. This would be achieved, let us say it
once again, through the monetary and financial intermediation of the ECB, and would invest the
ECB with the tasks of creating the euro as a European vehicular money, managing the system of
inter-European (gross) settlements, and providing extra investments to less developed countries.
The present structure of the ECB and of the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross-
settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET) will make it extremely easy to implement a
regime of absolute exchange rates at the European level. What about the international level
then? How may exchange rate stability be achieved world-wide?
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What future for the world?
At the Economic Forum held at the IMF, November 8, 2000, the main item on the agenda
concerned the possibility of transforming the world into a unique currency area. All the participants
agreed on the unrealistic character of such a proposal if by world currency union it is meant the
introduction of one single world currency. Do things change radically if – as Mundell does – we
define a currency area as a zone of fixed exchange rates? Is it reasonable to suggest that all the
countries of the world should enter a single currency area by fixing the exchange rates of their
national currencies to a unique standard (a currency or a basket of currencies)? Certainly not if
the model proposed were that of a currency board or of dollarisation. As we have shown in the
first part of this paper, each of these solutions will seriously hamper economic development and
will soon become untenable. A much better model would seem to be that of the euro area, where
twelve national currencies are part of a system in which each of them may be exchanged against
any other only at a fixed exchange rate. Yet, a fixed exchange rate system such as that momentarily
adopted by the majority of EU countries may be viable only in the short term. If it is not rapidly
replaced by monetary unification – which is precisely what these EU countries are committed to
do –, destabilising pressures will unavoidably grow and lead countries to abandon the system in
order to recover monetary sovereignty. If it is true, as Mundell observes, that fixed and irrevocable
exchange rates are bound to completely abolish speculative capital movements, it is also certain
that if the present structure of international payments is not modified, settlement of international
transactions will go on increasing the amount of speculative capital available internationally.
Irrevocably fixing exchange rates will thus not be enough to introduce monetary order world-
wide. Besides, disparities among countries are so great, that it is foolish to believe that the
conditions for the creation of a global currency area will be met in the foreseeable future.
Today, experts seem unanimous in forecasting the formation of two or three big currency
areas in which all the existing national currencies might gradually converge. ‘[T]he advent of
the euro and the move of a number of countries toward euro- or dollar-based pegs (possibly as a
precursor to full monetary union or dollarization) indicates a trend movement toward a bi- or tri-
polar system of major currency areas’ (Mussa et al 2000: 36). Hence, while it is difficult to
foresee the creation of other currency areas in the near future, the primacy of dollar, euro and yen
seems sufficiently well established to make a tripolar system the most likely substitute for the
present dollar-standard system. Now, the majority of experts seem to endorse the idea that a
regime of floating exchange rates will be best suited to deal with fluctuations among the three
major currencies than any pegged exchange rate regime. Given the great instability shown by
these three currencies, the costs of managing a system of pegged exchange rates would be too
high and its results too hazardous for it to be a viable alternative to free floating. It is generally
believed, therefore, that exchange rates between dollar, euro and yen will continue to exhibit a
high degree of volatility and that in order to limit their fluctuations monetary authorities will
simply turn to an informal or loose system of co-ordinated foreign exchange market interventions.
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In this respect, Mundell’s is a voice out of the chorus. He claims, in fact, that a system of
fixed exchange rates among the three major currency areas is perfectly conceivable today and
would greatly benefit monetary stability6. According to Mundell, exchange rates between the
dollar, the euro and the yen should be ‘locked’ replicating what was done in Europe in 1999.
What he proposes is a three-currency monetary union in which speculative capital movements
would be abolished by the simple fact that exchange rates would remain irrevocably fixed. As
we have already noted, however, the decision of irrevocably fixing exchange rates is not enough
to avoid the accumulation of international speculative capital. Duplication would still occur, and
exchange rate stability itself would be continuously threatened by speculation. Transactions on
the foreign exchange market, in fact, would put the three major currencies under a destabilising
pressure, which, far from leading to an exchange rate fluctuation, would provoke disruptive
variations in interest rates, inflation rates, employment, capital accumulation, and so on. The
conditions required for the implementation of a currency area would no longer be fulfilled and a
return to free or partially managed floating would be unavoidable.
Yet, Mundell’s proposal deserves serious consideration. A system of stable exchange rates
extended to the dollar, the euro and the yen would indeed mark a clear progress towards
international monetary order. Now, the main obstacle to this end is the fact that today currencies
are traded on the foreign exchange market and that exchange rates are their relative prices. As
long as this is the case, any attempt to fix exchange rates is bound to failure. As we have seen in
the euro case, true exchange rate stability can be achieved – without giving up monetary
sovereignty – only by moving from the present regime of relative exchange rates to a new regime
of absolute exchange rates. If this were done for the dollar, the euro and the yen their exchange
rates would acquire a much greater stability, for they would no longer contribute to the increase
of speculative capital. It is true, of course, that complete stability could be reached only if the
currencies already present on the foreign exchange market were no longer objects of trade. But
it is also true that once the principles of absolute exchange rates are correctly understood, the
logic of monetary payments will point to the solution. More specifically, the new system will
allow experts to work out a plan to avoid speculative trading on the foreign exchange market and
to gradually reabsorb (for example, through a capital-equity programme) the speculative capital
formed so far.
As for the three-currency area envisaged by Mundell, its realisation will require the
institution of an international central bank responsible for issuing a currency that will become
the common standard for dollar, euro and yen and that will be used to carry out payments among
countries of the three currency areas. The new central bank will also have to act as a clearing
agent in connection with the central banks of the three regions. What is needed for the whole
system to work is therefore that (a) within each currency area payments among countries be
carried out through the intermediation of their central banks and of a central bank of central
banks, and that (b) between currency areas an international central bank act as the central bank
of their central banks.
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Figure 1
Figure 1 depicts the pyramidal structure of the new system. On the bottom line we find the
commercial banks (COB) operating in each single country of the three-currency area. Their
transactions are carried out in domestic currencies, for countries maintain their monetary
sovereignty. The second line represents the national central banks (NCB). They act as clearing
agents of commercial banks and guarantee national monetary homogeneity. At the third level we
have the central banks of the euro, dollar and yen currency areas. They guarantee monetary
homogeneity in each area through the emission of a monetary standard used as vehicular currency
by member countries in all of their reciprocal payments. They also provide a mechanism for the
financial settlement of transactions by operating a system of clearing in collaboration with national
central banks. Then, at the top of our figure, we have represented the international central bank
(ICB), which brings the European central bank (ECB), the American central bank (AMCB) and
the Asian central bank (ASCB) together into a system of international clearing based, like the
national clearings, on the principles of real-time gross-settlement transfers. Finally, DM stands
for the domestic money used in each country; the euro, the dollar and the yen are the currencies
used within each currency area when payments between member countries are concerned; and
the international money (IM) is the new means of payment used to vehiculate transactions among
the three-currency area members and between them and the Rest of the World.
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Conclusion
In Appendix IV of the IMF Occasional paper No. 193 devoted to exchange rate regimes in an
increasingly integrated world, we read: ‘it must be recognized that while so far economic science
has developed a number of criteria that seem relevant for the choice of exchange rate regime,
there is no agreement on how precisely to quantify the various criteria or, to the extent that they
conflict, on how to decide which should take priority’ (Mussa et al 2000: 48). This is indeed the
present state of the art as far as exchange rate regimes are concerned. We maintain that the main
cause of most economists’ uncertainty and disagreement is the lack of distinction between relative
and absolute exchange rates. In particular, a clear step forward towards monetary stability will
be achieved when payments are carried out without entailing any duplication, that is, respecting
the vehicular nature of money. The European attempt to create a common monetary area is of a
great interest, for it goes a long way in the right direction. If it failed, it would be a disaster that
would weigh heavily on all those people who believe in European integration and in monetary
stability. This is why it is necessary to face and thoroughly analyse all the problems related to
monetary unification. The loss of monetary sovereignty to which the adoption of the euro as a
unique currency will lead has arguably been underestimated in its negative consequences on
capital movements. Given the past and present economic situation of EU member countries,
monetary unification will be a great threat to employment in the South and a cause of increasing
social turmoil in the North. These should be good enough reasons to push ECB’s experts to look
afresh at the role of the euro. As recent analysis shows, in fact, the very objective of monetary
unification – exchange rate stability – may be reached while allowing countries to maintain their
sovereignty.
In this short essay we have summed up the principles on which the new European payments
system should rest. Our aim is mainly to raise the reader’s interest in a reform that could rapidly
and easily be enforced at the EU level. The necessary institutions are already in place, and the
ECB could well take on the task of devising for Europe a sound and stable payments system
between sovereign countries. Let us hope that European experts will not immolate scientific
analysis on the altar of politics, and that they will follow Schmitt’s example in a joint effort to
give Europe and the world a real chance to achieve monetary stability.
If ‘impossible’ lives in Utopia, it is certainly not utopian to suppose that, once achieved,
scientific progress may take hold of people’s mind, especially if the well-being of whole
populations depends on it. In our field, advancement of learning is threefold. Bank money
is a means of payment and not a net asset (bank money is an object of mediation and not a
final product); European monetary union requires the creation of a common currency of
European countries and not a single currency for their residents. Finally, the European
central bank will issue a basket of currencies, i. e. [the euro] as it is already defined today.
(Schmitt 1988: 173, our translation)
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Notes
1
 See Quaderno di ricerca No. 2 in this series.
2
 With the exception of Denmark, United Kingdom and Sweden.
3
 The correct functioning of a banking system, in fact, does not allow for any gain of seigniorage.
As every banker knows, banks do not create wealth or riches when issuing money. Thus, allowing
banks to derive a seigniorage from money creation simply amounts to an inflationary emission
that has no citizenship in an orderly monetary system.
4
 Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
5
 See Cencini and Schmitt (1992).
6
 See Mundell et al (2000).
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